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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2001, a Muslim preacher named Ali al-Timimi 
gathered together at least eight of his followers in Virginia to discuss 
a plan of action following the 9/11 attacks.1  To ensure the meeting’s 
secrecy, al-Timimi and the attendees drew the window blinds and 
disconnected the phones.2  Al-Timimi then told them that the 
gathering was an amana—“a trust that should be kept secret.”3  He 
stated that the 9/11 attacks “were justified” and that “the end of time 
battle had begun.”4  Al-Timimi discussed possibilities for his followers 
to travel abroad, stressing that the best option would be to answer the 
call of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, to fight against 
American troops who were expected to invade Afghanistan in pursuit 
of al-Qaeda.5 
To justify fighting Americans, al-Timimi cited fatwas, or religious 
rulings.6  When his followers asked to review the fatwas, al-Timimi 
told them to burn the documents after reading them.7  Al-Timimi 
further advised his followers that Lashkar-e-Taiba (“L.E.T.”)8 in 
                                                          
 1. Indictment of Defendant at 4, 5, United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 1:04cr385 
(E.D. Va. 2004) [hereinafter Indictment available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae 
/ArchivePress/SeptemberPDFArchive/04/TimimiINDC092304.pdf.  Although the 
Indictment serves only as the Government’s allegation of facts, there is no formal 
court opinion from which to draw the facts otherwise, aside from the related opinion 
affirming the conviction of al-Timimi’s associates in United States v. Khan.  Further, as 
the jury ultimately convicted al-Timimi on all counts, the facts of the Indictment may 
be viewed as more credible than an undecided charge, having ostensibly gained the 
endorsement of the panel.   
 2. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 3. Id. at 809.  The secrecy of the meeting was underscored when one of al-
Timimi’s followers arrived with a friend who was not a member of the “paintball” 
group.  Id. at 810.  When the two arrived, discussion ceased until both men departed.  
Id.; cf. Paul Bradley, Muslim Cleric Indicted in Paintball Case; Six Terror Charges Say He 
Urged His Followers to Train for Holy War, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2004, at B4 
(describing al-Timimi’s followers as having trained in paintball skirmishes in 
northern Virginia, at the behest of, and with the knowledge of, al-Timimi).  But cf. 
Karen Branch-Brioso, U.S. Inquiry Puts Spotlight on Muslim War Gamers; Paintball Play 
Had No Terrorist Tie, Suspects Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 2003, at A1 
(refuting allegations that al-Timimi knew of the paintball skirmishes and that the 
skirmishes served as preparation for jihad). 
 4. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. L.E.T. is a State Department-designated “foreign terrorist organization.”  See 
Office of Counterterrorism Fact Sheet on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), 
Oct. 11, 2005, http://www. state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (identifying L.E.T. as 
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Pakistan was the correct organization from which to obtain military 
training prior to taking up arms in Afghanistan, because its belief 
system was good and it focused on combat.9  After the meeting, four 
of al-Timimi’s followers agreed to travel immediately to L.E.T.10  The 
following day, al-Timimi told two of the four followers how to reach 
L.E.T. undetected.11  By September 22, 2001, these four followers had 
obtained travel visas, driven to J.F.K. airport in New York, and flown 
to Karachi, Pakistan.12  Within another two weeks, all four were 
training and firing weapons in L.E.T.13 
This Comment discusses whether al-Timimi’s words are protected 
under the U.S. Constitution.  In April 2005, al-Timimi was convicted 
in federal district court, and in July, he was sentenced to life in 
prison.14  As the first significant conviction targeting terrorist speech15 
in the post-9/11 era,16 the resolution of this case on appeal will 
                                                          
“Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)”). 
 9. Indictment, supra note 1, at 6.  Lashkar-e-Taiba is the military wing of Markaz 
Dawa Wa’al Irshad, “which was founded to organize Pakistani mujahideen . . . against 
the Russians in Afghanistan.”  Id.  Since the Russians departed, a primary focus of 
L.E.T. has been to conduct jihad against India.  Id.  L.E.T. claims to have trained 
individuals who fight today in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and 
the Philippines.  Id. at 2. 
 10. Id. at 6-7. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Indictment, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 13. Id. at 7-8. 
 14. See Jerry Markon, Jurors Convict Muslim Leader in Terrorism Case, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 27, 2005, at A1 (convicting al-Timimi on all ten counts after seven days of jury 
deliberation); Matthew Barakat, Islamic Scholar Gets Life in Prison in Va., A.P., July 13, 
2005 (reporting Judge Leonie Brinkema’s belief that the evidence supported the 
mandatory life sentence). 
 15. This particular case raises the issue of whether al-Timimi was in fact 
advocating terrorist activity, or merely unlawful activity.  For an in-depth discussion 
on the nuances of defining terrorism, see WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM 1-10 (2005).  For the purposes of this Comment, “terrorist” activity is used 
interchangeably with “unlawful” activity because the question raised only revolves 
around whether al-Timimi exercised free speech.  It is ultimately irrelevant whether 
al-Timimi in fact advocated terrorism, because his appeal does not hinge on this 
distinction.  See “Defense in Terror Cases to Challenge NSA Spying,” Dec. 28, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10628591/ (reporting al-Timimi’s appeal on free 
speech grounds).  Thus, the headline of this Comment, “Preaching Terror,” is 
designed to apply to preachers who may advocate acts beyond the scope of al-
Timimi’s indictment.  But cf. Christine Chinlund, Who should wear the ‘terrorist’ label?, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2003, at A15 (describing one journalistic approach to the 
semantics of terrorism:  “call the act terrorist, but not the organization”). 
 16. Cf. Patrick Wintour, Blair Vows to Root Out Extremism, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, 
Aug. 6, 2005, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5256534-116499,00.html 
(announcing a British initiative to ban the preaching of terrorism in an effort to rein 
in domestic extremism); The Preachings of Abu Hamza, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Feb. 7, 
2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1704312,00.html (relaying the 
words of  the London Finsbury Mosque’s cleric Abu Hamza, who was convicted on 
charges of incitement).  Abu Hamza counseled his listeners “to stab [the West] here 
and there until he bleeds to death.  Then you can cut up the meat as you like to, or 
leave it to maggots.  This is the first stage of jihad.” 
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strongly impact the government’s efforts to combat Islamist17 
terrorism.18  Prior to the al-Timimi case, the government had only 
prosecuted the perpetrators of terrorist acts and those who provided 
tangible assistance to terrorist organizations.19  However, al-Timimi’s 
conviction targeted a speaker who merely incited and advocated a 
                                                          
 17. See 9/11 COMMISSION,  FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 47-53 (2004) (terming the movement 
in the Muslim world that inspires terrorism “Islamism,” whose actors are “Islamists”).  
But see Caleb Carr, U.S. Needs a Clear Definition of Terrorism, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 2004, at 
A49 (criticizing the 9/11 Commission’s decision to redefine terrorism around 
“Islamism” because American strategy is not served by promulgating a “clash of 
civilizations” thesis).  This Comment adopts the language of the 9/11 Commission, 
because the panel represents a relative measure of consensus and bipartisanship in 
the national body politic.  Further, this Comment only refers to “Islamist terrorism” 
or “Islamist terrorist” and not “Islamist” alone in the attempt to narrow the subject to 
only those Islamists who advocate or participate in terrorist acts.  See Aliya Haider, 
The Rhetoric of Resistance:  Islamism, Modernity, and Globalization, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER 
L.J. 91, 106, 109 (2002) (“Islamism is the sentiment that expresses the movement, 
politicized Islam.  Islamists are those persons who use the tool of Islamism to 
propagate an ideology and justify a political goal through religion . . . .  Islamism’s 
goal is not Islam.”).  In addition to “Islamism,” there are various other terms applied 
by reporters and experts.  See, e.g., BERNARD LEWIS, THE SHAPING OF THE MODERN 
MIDDLE EAST 124 (1994) (couching Islamism in terms of Islamic fundamentalism); 
Thomas L. Friedman, Sinbad the Martian, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2005, at 
Opinion3 (“Islamo-fascism”); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Hang-Tough Nation, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 2005, at 76 (“Islamofasicsts”); Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 
Islam can vote, if we let it, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A13 (“political Islam”); Abdul 
Cader Asmal, Foe isn’t Islam, it’s Binladenism, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 2005, at A11 
(“Binladenism”); Don Thompson, Terrorists May Be Trying to Recruit U.S. Prisoners, 
A.P., Aug. 21, 2005 (“radical Islam”). 
 18. See Markon, supra note 14 (recognizing the Justice Department’s praise that 
the prosecution of the al-Timimi “Virginia jihad network” was one of the most 
successful prosecutions of domestic terrorism since September 11, 2001); see also 
Indictment, United States v. Sami Omar al-Hussayen, No. 03-048  (D. Id. Feb. 13, 
2003) (charging a Saudi grad student in Idaho for supporting Hamas by setting up 
and running web sites to recruit terrorists); No Immigration Charges, Deportation for 
Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, A.P., July 1, 2004 (discussing the acquittal of al-Hussayen on 
four charges and the dismissal of the remaining eight charges in exchange for al-
Hussayen’s deportation back to Saudi Arabia). 
 19. See United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 818-27 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(finding nine of al-Timimi’s followers guilty of a variety of charges, including 
conspiracy to levy war against the United States and numerous firearms offenses); see 
also United States v. Ashfari, 412 F.3d 1071, 1074-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (labeling the 
donation of money to a designated terrorist organization beyond the scope of free 
speech protection); Faris v. United States, 388 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (prosecuting 
defendant for providing material support to al-Qaeda); United States v. Al-Arian, 329 
F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (requiring heightened standard of proof for 
the government in charging defendants with assisting foreign terrorist 
organizations); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 170-72 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(upholding conviction by jury trial for conspiracy to bomb United States commercial 
airlines in Southeast Asia and on charges relating to the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center); United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 1670 (2005) (imprisoning defendant for conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism); 
Feds Probe Possible California Terror Cell, FOX NEWS, June 9, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,158880,00.html (revealing investigation into 
a Pakistani plot to attack hospitals and supermarkets in the United States). 
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terrorist act.20  If upheld, the conviction will represent a major shift in 
the courtroom battle in the “War on Terror”21 by extending the arm 
of the law to criminalize a purported source of terrorism.22 
The Constitution prohibits the government from criminalizing an 
individual’s opinion merely because it is unpopular.23  However, limits 
on the protection of free speech do exist,24 as epitomized by Justice 
Robert Jackson’s belief that the Bill of Rights is not a suicide pact.25  
The War on Terror challenges the United States to combat the 
terrorist threat while concomitantly preserving the country’s free 
speech liberties.26  Unlike the Communist Party-U.S.A. in the 1940s,27 
                                                          
 20. See Prosecutors Say Islamic Scholar Urged Followers to Violence, RICH. TIMES 
DISPATCH, Apr. 19, 2005, http://www.religionnewsblog.com/11009 (paraphrasing 
prosecutors’ belief that al-Timimi urged his followers to take up arms against U.S. 
troops).  But see Pierre Tristam, Words Matter in War on Terror, DAYTONA NEWS-J., July 
19, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0719-28.htm (dubbing al-Timimi 
a “moronic loud-mouth” who is being unfairly punished for his words, and not his 
actions). 
 21. This Comment utilizes the term “War on Terror” because it best encompasses 
the ongoing, although ambiguous and not necessarily military, counterterrorism 
efforts in Afghanistan and around the world.  Although “War on Terror” may be 
viewed by some as a partisan term, this Comment does not employ the phrase with 
the intention to endorse the Bush Administration policies that commonly 
accompany its use.  For a discussion on the role played by semantics in war, see 
Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat?  Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction 
of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 8 (2004) (“Understanding the contestable 
character of the legal construction of war is crucial for enabling us to imagine the 
wide range of possible forms that that construction may take.”). 
 22. See Holly Coates Keehn, Terroristic Religious Speech:  Giving the Devil the Benefit of 
the First Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1230, 
1231 (1998) (arguing that prosecuting “terroristic” speech, as opposed to terrorist 
activity raises immediate constitutional issues and would embody a shift in 
government tactics).  
 23. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“[T]here is no such 
thing as a false idea.”); cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (contending that the First Amendment requires us to 
tolerate speech even if we believe it is “fraught with death”); Thomas E. Crocco, 
Inciting Terrorism on the Internet:  An Application of Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451, 453 (2004) (“[S]peech that contributes to the free 
exchange of diverse ideas is constitutionally welcome, no matter how unpopular, 
misguided, or repugnant it is perceived to be.”). 
 24. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973) (withholding free speech 
protection for mass-mailing “obscene” and unsolicited material), and Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (excluding “fighting words” from the 
purview of free speech protection), with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17 (1971) 
(protecting defendant’s lewd expression because his words failed to meet the 
obscenity standard), and Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988) (observing that 
free speech did not rise to the level of libel or the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress). 
 25. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“The choice is not between order and liberty.  It is between liberty with order and 
anarchy without either.  There is a danger that, if the Court does not temper its 
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of 
Rights into a suicide pact.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
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the goal of Islamist terrorists is not to gather popular support to 
overthrow the U.S. government.28  Rather, Islamist terrorists succeed 
in achieving their goal by maintaining a subversive, amorphous 
network.29  This Comment argues that the present-day standard for 
incitement-type speech should be recast in the context of the War on 
Terror.  When analyzed in this context, the scope of “imminence” 
can be broadened beyond strict temporal limits, and as a result, may 
render al-Timimi’s words unlawful. 
First, this Comment will discuss the development of free speech 
parameters during times of national crises.  Historically, the Supreme 
                                                          
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered title numbers and sections of 
the U.S.C.) (representing the Federal government’s most visible attempt to rein in 
the domestic terrorist threat); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE 
OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/s 
plit/documents/guidance_on_race.htm (prohibiting any federal law enforcement 
agency from using racial characteristics in routine investigations).  But cf. CHERYL 
LITTLE & KATHIE KLARREICH, FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER, SECURING OUR 
BORDERS:  POST 9/11 SCAPEGOATING OF IMMIGRANTS 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.fiacfla.org/reports/securingborders.pdf (criticizing the Bush 
Administration’s post-9/11 immigration policy for weakening American civil 
liberties).  See generally Carol L. Chomsky, Viewing September 11 Through the Lens of 
History, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1437, 1447 (2005) (arguing that the very term “homeland 
security” implies a friction between facing a threat and maintaining yesterday’s 
comforts, while suggesting “a commonality of ancestry and history, not just a 
common political allegiance, and therefore serv[ing] to reinforce an exclusionary 
reaction to immigrants”); Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few 
Convictions on Terrorism Charges; Statistics Often Count Lesser Crimes, WASH. POST, June 
12, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html (illustrating the Justice Department’s poor 
record since 2001 in prosecuting terrorist suspects). 
 27. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1951) (describing the 
Communist Party—U.S.A. platform as based on teaching and advocating the 
overthrow of the U.S. government by force and violence); see also Michael R. 
Belknap, Cold War in the Courtroom:  The Foley Square Communist Trial, in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL TRIALS 208, 219 (Michael R. Belknap ed., Greenwood 1994) (reproducing 
deposition testimony from Communist Party-U.S.A. leaders who argued that the 
“[Communist Party-U.S.A.] sought to convert America to socialism not by force, but 
rather by educating the masses about the need to build a political organization 
committed to that economic system and by persuading a majority of the people to 
adopt it”). 
 28. See 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 51 (elaborating on Islamism’s goals to 
force America to “abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the 
immorality and godlessness of its society and culture”).  But see Robert Pape, Blowing 
Up An Assumption, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A23, available at http://www.iht.com/ 
articles/2005/05/18/opinion/edpape.php (contending that different terrorist 
groups have different goals and that a suicide terrorist’s goal is strategic, limited and 
secular). 
 29. See 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 54-59 (expounding upon the complex 
organization that contributed to Bin Ladin’s support network, traversing mosques, 
schools, boardinghouses, and  financiers, with each cog playing a distributively minor 
role so as to go unnoticed to law enforcement authorities worldwide).  But see Scott 
Atran, A Leaner, Meaner Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at A27 (responding that, 
ultimately, terrorism succeeds precisely because it garners popular support for the 
jihad movement). 
TANENBAUM.OFFTOPRINTER 2/23/2006  3:53:38 PM 
2006] PREACHING TERROR 791 
Court has justified the curtailment of free speech during wartime 
because the context of war presented the arguable need to limit some 
speech in the interest of national preservation.30  However, the 
governing case for incitement-type speech is Brandenburg v. Ohio,31 in 
which the Court ascribed temporal limits to free speech with little 
consideration of context.32  This section will address the Court’s 
struggle between employing a contextual analysis versus a temporal 
analysis to evaluate whether the given speech causes imminent lawless 
action. 
Next, this Comment will apply Brandenburg to al-Timimi and argue 
that the War on Terror presents a scenario that satisfies the 
“imminence” test.  Secretive and detailed incitement that has no 
intent or opportunity to compete in the “marketplace of ideas” 
should not be protected under the Constitution.33  Although al-
Timimi’s words incited action far abroad and possibly days or weeks 
down the road, his advice, steeped in a universalist Wahhabi-Islamist 
doctrine,34 rendered unlawful action imminent and likely to occur in 
the context of a global War on Terror. 
Third, this Comment will make two mutually exclusive 
recommendations.  First, this Comment will recommend that the 
Brandenburg “imminence” test be applied with an understanding of 
                                                          
 30. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208 (1919) (proffering wartime 
as a context sufficient to condemn certain speech even if that same speech could not 
be condemned during peacetime); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224-
25 (1944) (rationalizing that war produces hardships against liberties that the law 
sometimes cannot overrule).  See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of 
Emergency:  States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 
1002-03 (2004) (observing that certain wartime crises create a reaction towards 
national preservation, even above the law). 
 31. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 32. See id. at 446-48 (basing its analysis solely on the words of the speaker and 
finding the conviction untenable because the statute punishes “mere advocacy.”  In 
Brandenburg, the defendant was initially convicted for urging his listeners to forcefully 
return the “nigger” to Africa, and the “Jew . . . to Israel.”  Id. at 447.  The Court 
overruled the decision because the defendant’s words did not cross the plane of 
imminence.  Id. at 447-49.  But cf. H. Brian Holland, Inherently Dangerous:  The Potential 
for an Internet-Specific Standard Restricting Speech that Performs a Teaching Function, 39 
U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 396 (2005) (comparing internet cases to Brandenburg, where, even 
though circumstances play a minor role, there is always a “contextual tipping point” 
in determining “imminence”). 
 33. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(believing an opinion that competes with truth in the public forum must be entitled 
to protection, even “when a man says he has squared the circle”); cf. Keehn, supra 
note 22, at 1253 (averring that if the incitement-type speech does not set a date for 
breaking the law, it is much more difficult to constitutionally punish the speaker). 
 34. See Tashbih Sayyed, Preachers of Prey, PAKISTAN TODAY, Jan. 3, 2003, 
http://www.paktoday.com/prey.htm (describing the Wahhabi ideology as seeking to 
erase all other religions and democratic values in the pursuit of establishing an 
Islamic theocracy); supra notes 170-171 (describing further the ideology of 
Wahhabism). 
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context rather than solely within the framework of temporal 
limitations.  Although Brandenburg and its progeny embodied the 
Court’s shift towards stricter temporal limits,35 the characteristics of 
the War on Terror present a context that renders a strict temporal 
analysis ineffective.36  Alternatively, this Comment will recommend 
that if the Court holds that Brandenburg is not the governing standard 
for private speech, al-Timimi’s conviction must be upheld under a 
non-Brandenburg standard that retains the “marketplace”37 
foundation.  This alternative recommendation will take into account 
the threat posed by incitement-type speech that does not face 
competition in the “marketplace of ideas.” 
I. BACKGROUND ON FREE SPEECH DURING                                                
TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISES 
From World War I through the Cold War, the Court sparred over 
the precise constitutional import of “make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”38  In the early years of this judicial struggle, the 
context of an individual’s speech proved most significant in the 
Court’s assessment of free speech parameters.39  Later, and largely up 
until the present day, temporal limits, as exemplified by Brandenburg, 
proved dispositive.40  Yet, this Comment cannot begin with 
                                                          
 35. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) 
(finding that advocacy of violence “weeks or months” down the road is too 
indeterminable to render punishment lawful); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
706 (1969) (invalidating the conviction of an individual who, at a public rally, said 
“‘[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.’”) 
(emphasis added). 
 36. See Crocco, supra note 23, at 482 (“We are under attack and are being 
subjected to a type of tyranny that operates to contravene the rights and benefits of 
citizenship accorded by an open and free society.  Until terrorism is removed from 
the world, there exists a ‘threshold of imminence’ such that the potential for 
additional terrorist acts is so great that they must be considered imminent.”); see also 
Jennifer Hannigan, Playing Patriot Games:  National Security Challenges Civil Liberties, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1390 (2004) (submitting that “the ‘war on terrorism’ is not a 
traditional war with a clearly identifiable enemy and an articulable timeline”). 
 37. See infra Part I.B (discussing the development of a First Amendment 
jurisprudence framing the appropriate temporal limitations in regards to the 
availability of competing thoughts in the “marketplace of ideas,” a term used by 
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
(1920)). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See generally Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis:  
Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2003) 
(emphasizing the historical significance of the years 1919-1969 for modern free 
speech jurisprudence). 
 39. See infra Part I.A (documenting the emergence of free speech during World 
War I). 
 40. See infra Part I.C-D (describing the development of free speech after World 
War II). 
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Brandenburg, because Brandenburg was not born in a vacuum.41  By 
understanding the doctrinal origins of modern free speech law,42 one 
may apply and adapt the constitutional standard to new and unique 
scenarios.43  This section lays the foundation of early free speech law, 
which is no longer fully utilized, and of a timeless “marketplace” 
approach that remains especially relevant for the al-Timimi case. 
A. Emergence of a Free Speech Jurisprudence During World War I 
Until the immediate post-World War I period, the Supreme Court 
did not address the limits of free speech in the context of a national 
emergency.44  However, in a one-week span in 1919, the Supreme 
Court decided three free speech cases, known as the Wartime 
Trilogy.45  In the first case, Schenck v. United States,46 Justice Holmes 
authored a unanimous opinion upholding the defendant’s conviction 
under the Espionage Act.47  As General Secretary of the Socialist 
                                                          
 41. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT 
LAW 13-55 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing the development of the incitement 
jurisprudence leading up to Brandenburg). 
 42. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:  THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 161-
67 (1994) (crediting Judge Hand’s Masses approach, and Justice Holmes’ “clear and 
present danger” test, as the primary contributors to modern jurisprudence). 
 43. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterps., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Brandenburg to a civil suit involving the publisher of a murder manual who was held 
liable for a wrongful death suit).  But cf. United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260-
61 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply Brandenburg to a case involving threats to kill the 
President because Brandenburg is limited to advocacy cases). 
 44. But cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 11-25 (1998) 
(summarizing the Civil War case of Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861), 
which, although it does not directly address free speech, remains relevant in 
signifying the government’s attempt to restrain civil liberties at a time of exigent 
circumstances).  In 1861, faced with a dissolving Union and a vulnerable Capital in 
urgent need of troops and supplies, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus along the rail routes from the north.  Id.  Less than a month after Lincoln’s 
suspension, John Merryman was arrested for participating in the destruction of 
railroad bridges north of Baltimore.  Id. at 26.  When the military authority refused 
to turn Merryman over to the civilian authority, Chief Justice Roger Taney, sitting as 
a Maryland circuit judge, held that the president “cannot suspend the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus.”  Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 145 (D. Md. 1861).  
Although Merryman was released shortly thereafter, the challenge to the President’s 
authority to suspend habeas corpus was never judicially resolved.  REHNQUIST, supra, 
at 60.  Lincoln noted in response the contextual vacuum from which Taney sat:  “Are 
all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”  President Lincoln, Message to a Special Session of Congress 
(July 4, 1861), in REHNQUIST, supra, at 38.  An important lesson to be learned from Ex 
parte Merryman is that context matters.  Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas 
Corpus:  An Answer From the Arguments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 11 (2004). 
 45. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 
249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 46. 249 U.S. 47. 
 47. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); see Schenck, 249 
U.S. at 52 (enumerating the defendant’s violations to include obstruction of military 
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Party, the defendant had printed circulars denouncing the military 
draft.48  While Justice Holmes admitted that “in many places and in 
ordinary times” the circulars would be protected by the Constitution, 
he denied them First Amendment protection because “the character 
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”49  
In the context of a war for which millions of soldiers needed to be 
recruited, words that created a “clear and present danger” that a 
“substantive evil” may result—in this case, threats to Congress’s 
conscription efforts—may be constitutionally abridged.50  Justice 
Holmes did not find it necessary for the “substantive evil” to actually 
result.51  Instead, the Court could restrict free speech if it was 
expressed with the requisite intent, coupled with the “tendency” to 
dampen the willingness of Americans to serve in the military.52 
A week later, in Frohwerk v. United States, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the Espionage Act.53  In another unanimous opinion, 
Justice Holmes affirmed the conviction of a publisher whose 
newspaper decried the involvement of the United States in the war 
against Germany.54  Referring to the opinion in Schenck,55 yet failing to 
mention the nascent “clear and present danger” standard, Justice 
Holmes wrote that circumstances abridging speech are “quarters 
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame.”56 
Finally, Debs v. United States,57 decided on the same day as Frohwerk, 
involved the former presidential candidate of the Socialist party, 
Eugene V. Debs.58  In that case, the defendant delivered several 
                                                          
recruiting and causing insubordination within the military forces). 
 48. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. 
 49. Id. at 52. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (“If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the 
intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that 
success alone warrants making the act a crime.”). 
 52. Id.; cf. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:  
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 384-89 (2000) 
(describing the “bad tendency” test as requiring no actual consequences, nor any 
need to show a temporal connection between the speech at issue and the evil 
presumed to result from it). 
 53. See 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (addressing the defendant’s conviction for 
conspiring to cause disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 206. 
 56. Id. at 209. 
 57. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 58. Id.; see generally David Ray Papke, Eugene Debs as Legal Heretic:  The Law-Related 
Conversion, Catechism and Evangelism of an American Socialist, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 
360-61 (1994) (describing Debs’ speeches, delivered as part of a continuous 
Presidential campaign from 1900 to 1920 except for 1916 when Debs ran for 
Congress, as “an opportunity to educate workers in the evils of capitalism and the 
virtues of socialism”). 
TANENBAUM.OFFTOPRINTER 2/23/2006  3:53:38 PM 
2006] PREACHING TERROR 795 
incendiary speeches protesting military conscription, leading to 
charges of  obstructing the recruiting efforts of the United States.59  
Like in Frohwerk, the Supreme Court failed to use the “clear and 
present danger” standard, but referred to Schenck,60 in affirming Debs’ 
conviction under the Espionage Act.61  Justice Holmes again authored 
the opinion, finding that the trial court had carefully instructed the 
jury not to find Debs guilty unless the speech had a “natural tendency 
and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service . . . 
and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his 
mind.”62 
Of the three opinions, Debs is the most puzzling because Debs did 
not direct his speech to specific actors and did not appear to pose a 
“clear and present danger” of a “substantive evil.”63  Still, what is 
important to glean from all three cases is that the speakers were 
punished for public speech—speech made in public and intended to 
sway the public.64  The Court upheld the convictions because it 
believed that the threat posed by the public speech was sufficiently 
linked to a future harm.65  The Court established the link by analyzing 
                                                          
 59. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-16. 
 60. See id., at 215 (stating that any First Amendment defense relied upon by the 
defendant had already been “disposed of” in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919)). 
 61. See id. at 216-17 (upholding a ten-year sentence for obstructing the recruiting 
and enlistment service of the government by giving a speech to twelve hundred 
listeners); see also GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 196-97 (2004) (chronicling Debs’ status 
as a national figure, not a social castaway, who as leader of the Socialist Party 
garnered one million votes in the 1912 presidential election).  In fact, “one of every 
sixteen voters supported him.”  Id. 
 62. Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. 
 63. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1262-63 (1983) (arguing that Holmes did not decide Debs and 
Frohwerk on the honest doctrinal framework of “clear and present danger,” but 
remained lodged in a “bad tendency” analysis:  “Debs demonstrated Holmes’ 
continued reliance on the tendency of speech as the test for its legality and his 
willingness, bordering on eagerness, to sustain jury findings of fact.”). 
 64. See id. at 1309 (discerning that Holmes came to realize just a year later in 
Abrams that “speech on matters of public affairs deserves added protection and 
cannot be viewed in the same manner as a simple solicitation to do a private wrong”). 
 65. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 214-15 (stating the jury was warranted in finding that 
“[o]ne purpose of the speech . . . was to oppose not only war in general but this war, 
and that the opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect would 
be to obstruct recruiting”); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) 
(narrowing the inquiry to whether the overt acts were “done to effect the object of 
the conspiracy” and rejecting defendant’s argument that the conspiracy count must 
allege “the means by which the conspiracy was to be carried out”); Schenck, 249 U.S. 
at 51-52 (stating that “[i]t well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them 
may have been the main purpose . . . [b]ut the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done”).  The court went further to clarify that the 
main issue in such cases “[i]s whether the words used are used in such circumstances 
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the circumstances of war that magnified the probability and scope of 
the threatened harm.66  However, the Court’s notion of war remained 
wed to the tradition of a declared and finite war.67 
Eventually the Court, and Justice Holmes in particular,68 
transitioned to a more protective free speech environment.69  
Ironically, it was Justice Holmes himself who laid the groundwork for 
the modern-day doctrine governing protected free speech by stating 
that the courts should:  1) consider the circumstances and context 
surrounding the speech; and 2) draw a link between the speech and 
the threatened harm.70  How this foundation applies to an 
undeclared and seemingly endless war is a question that will be 
addressed shortly. 
                                                          
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”  Id. at 52.  The fact 
that the country is at war is a circumstance to be considered.  Id. 
 66. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (using a statistic-
like analysis to determine whether speech is unprotected by the First Amendment:  
“[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger”), aff’d, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951).  Judge Hand used this analysis in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 
535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  See infra text accompanying note 100. 
 67. See Scheppele, supra note 30, at 1015 (noting that World War I was fought in 
an era when wars were considered only of limited duration).  But cf. STONE, supra 
note 61, at 153-58 (observing that the Wilson Administration employed a vast 
propaganda network simply to uphold public support for seventeen months of 
American involvement in the war). 
 68. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (distinguishing the denial of citizenship to a woman claiming 
uncompromising pacifism from Schenck because the fear that she would “exert 
activities such as were dealt with in Schenck” were unfounded).  The court further 
stated that “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls 
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought 
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”  Id. at 654-55. 
 69. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 262-64 (1937) (rejecting for the first 
time the “bad tendency” test, which assesses the speech based on whether it has the 
tendency to incite lawless behavior, because the test has very “vague and 
indeterminate” boundaries that act like “a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who 
agitates for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have 
foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct of others”); Near v. 
Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (overturning a statute allowing 
injunctions against “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory” material); Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (invalidating a statute prohibiting display of 
red flags). 
 70. Accord Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (clarifying the “clear and present danger” test to require that the 
threatened harm be imminent and substantial enough to justify a valid restriction on 
speech, whereas the Wartime Trilogy appeared to only require a weak, facial link). 
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B. Holmes & Brandeis:  The “Marketplace of Ideas” Serving as a        
Doctrinal Basis for Temporal Limits 
While the Wartime Trilogy illustrated the contextual constraints on 
free speech, Justices Holmes and Brandeis authored a series of 
minority opinions in the following years that encouraged greater 
liberties for free speech, limited only by temporal boundaries.71  In 
time, Holmes’ and Brandeis’ reasoning framed the basis for the 
majority decisions broadening First Amendment rights.72 
In Abrams v. United States, the Court affirmed the conviction of 
Russian émigrés who printed leaflets that were critical of the 
American intervention in the Russian Revolution.73  In his dissent, 
Justice Holmes did not cite his Wartime Trilogy test, but rather 
eloquently articulated the “marketplace of ideas” doctrine, where 
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.”74 
                                                          
 71. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the 
government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the 
defendant’s views . . . . If the publication of this document had been laid as an 
attempt to induce an uprising against government at once and not at some indefinite 
time in the future it would have presented a different question. . . . But the 
indictment alleges the publication and nothing more”); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 
U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (positing that the statute at issue 
“abridges freedom of speech and of the press, not in a particular emergency, in 
order to avoid a clear and present danger, but under all circumstances . . . the 
teaching of the doctrine of pacifism”); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 493-94 
(1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting) (finding that the alleged omissions or 
additions in the contested news reports were harmless, and that applying a statute 
prohibiting false reports that interfere with the operation of the military in this way 
would unduly “discourage criticism of government policies” and “subject the press to 
new perils”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1920) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an 
intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of 
opinion where private rights are not concerned”). 
 72. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 504-07 (1951) (conceding that 
although the Court never “expressly overruled the majority opinions” in Schenck, 
Debs, Gitlow, and Whitney, “there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined 
toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 
(1940) (holding that the danger of injury was not “so serious nor so imminent as to 
justify the [statute’s] sweeping proscription” of picketing); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 
496 (1939) (invalidating a municipal ordinance that prohibited all public meetings 
in streets and other public places without a permit); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 
353 (1937) (reversing conviction for conducting a Communist meeting under an 
Oregon criminal syndicalism statute); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) 
(rejecting a tax on newspapers as an unconstitutional limit on the expression of free 
speech). 
 73. 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1920). 
 74. Id. at 630. Justice Holmes discusses the underlying theory of free speech: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.  If 
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result 
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away 
all opposition.  To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you 
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For Holmes, a society based on free thought will always have access 
to truth, and thus the threat of unpopular or dangerous speech is 
countered by its comparison to truth or another viewpoint.75  Still, 
Holmes retained an exception for speech that did not compete in the 
“marketplace of ideas”76—speech that “so imminently threatens 
immediate interference with lawful and pressing purposes of the law” 
as to escape the protection of the Constitution.77  A finding of 
imminence proved to be the essence of Holmes’ “clear and present 
danger” test.78  Yet, it would remain in dissent for decades more.79 
Justice Brandeis also employed the notion of a proverbial 
marketplace in his concurrence in Whitney v. California.80  Brandeis 
understood that a free society is sustainable because a government 
that rules with the consent of the governed puts its energies into 
bettering the lives of its’ citizens, and not by instilling order through 
fear:81 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that 
                                                          
think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the 
circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you 
doubt either your power or your premises . . . But when men have realized 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
Id. 
 75. See generally Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Institute of Paris, France (May 
10, 1919) (stating that “if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to 
advertise the fact by speaking”), quoted in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  But see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press:  —A New 
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1648 (1967) (voicing concern that 
“changes in the communications industry have destroyed the equilibrium of the 
marketplace”). 
 76. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (arguing that “[o]nly the emergency that 
makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time 
warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make no 
law abridging the freedom of speech’”). 
 77. Id. at 630; see Holly S. Hawkins, A Sliding Scale Approach For Evaluating the 
Terrorist Threat Over the Internet, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 647 (2005) (claiming that 
there is a “market failure” in the Internet context, where the speed of web 
communications does not allow for time to “ferret out erroneous arguments” 
presented by Islamist terrorists). 
 78. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (highlighting the true 
import of “clear and present danger” to require a finding of “imminence,” which was 
incorrectly manipulated in Whitney and many other decisions). 
 79. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-92 (1951) (Black & Douglas, JJ., 
dissenting) (dismissing the majority’s application of the “clear and present danger” 
test as mere rhetoric and a masquerade for prior censorship, far divorced from 
Holmes’ substantive test). 
 80. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
 81. See id. (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that the more open and tolerant 
the society, the more stable a society will be). 
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in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the 
arbitrary . . . . But they knew that order cannot be secured merely 
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to 
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable 
government . . . that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good 
ones.82 
Although the Court did not adopt the “marketplace” approach in 
Holmes’ or Brandeis’ lifetime, its resonance echoed deep into the 
free speech establishment.83  The purpose of the First Amendment 
was not just to bestow personal happiness through free expression,84 
but to ensure the health of an open society, as well.85  Dissent, no 
matter how distasteful, contributed to peaceful change, or at least 
provided an opportunity for the opposition to voice and reaffirm its 
position.86  However, within the “marketplace of ideas,” there arose 
temporal limits on punishing speech for advocating imminent 
harm.87  Speech that was closely connected in space and time to 
causing harm did not have an opportunity to compete with opposing 
opinions.88  In short, the Holmes-Brandeis approach understood that 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that 
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials”); STONE, supra note 61, at 522 (celebrating the 
Court’s unambiguous embrace of the Holmes-Brandeis version of clear and present 
danger in the 1960s). 
 84. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that free 
speech provides personal happiness and also reinforces “the discovery and spread of 
political truth”); cf. Howard O. Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles:  The First 
Amendment in the Supreme Court 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 132 (1986) (drawing a 
distinction between Holmes, whose progressive views were rooted in Social 
Darwinism, and Brandeis, a reformist pursuing “social and economic equality”). 
 85. See Rabban, supra note 63, at 1321 (stressing Brandeis’ belief in free speech as 
a prerequisite to democracy, and valuable to both individual and government).  But 
see Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141, 153-54 
(2005) (entertaining the idea that the “marketplace of ideas often favors dominant 
views” allowing for the ascendancy of destructive speech). 
 86. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 549 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (noting that speech extolling political violence is often “coupled” with 
sharp “criticism of defects in our society”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 
(1940) (reasoning that although the “tenets of one man may seem the rankest error 
to his neighbor,” and although a committed advocate may resort to “exaggeration, to 
vilification . . . and even to false statement,” freedom of all speech is “ordained” by 
the First Amendment).  But see Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment:  
Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 148 (1991) (charging that 
Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas” is a child of Social Darwinism, “rather than 
distributive justice”). 
 87. See infra notes 200-201 and accompanying text. 
 88. But see Robert Firester & Kendall T. Jones, Catchin’ the Heat of the Beat:  First 
Amendment Analysis of Music Claimed to Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2000) (arguing that virtually every time the Brandenburg temporal limitation on 
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certain types of speech did not reach the “marketplace,” and because 
of the speech’s immediate threat of harm, should not find 
constitutional cover.89 
C. The Cold War 
When World War II ended, the United States almost immediately 
entered a war unlike any other it had ever waged.90  The frontline of 
the Cold War was abroad, but seemed like it was in America, too.91  
Although no blood was spilled on American shores, the “Commie” 
paranoia that gripped the country ruined many lives.92  These events 
also found their way into the courtroom in battles over free speech.93 
The year leading up to Dennis v. United States94 was a dramatic 
period in the early Cold War.95  Leaders of the Communist Party-
U.S.A. were convicted at trial.96  The time seemed ripe for a new and 
decisive clarification of free speech jurisprudence.97  Instead, the 
                                                          
speech—“[o]nly when violent acts are so imminent [that] there is no time for 
response and discussion and thus no chance for the truth to prevail can speech be 
suppressed”—has been applied, “the speech has been protected”). 
 89. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (reiterating that 
“before utterances can be punished,” the “substantive evil must be extremely serious 
and the degree of imminence extremely high”). 
 90. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism:  The 
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 406-28 (recounting the 
progression of international crises and mounting tensions that characterized the 
period from 1945-50).  Many Americans felt a sense of “imminent apocalypse” 
following the Yalta Conference (“FDR’s perfidious abandonment of gallant Poland to 
a Stalinist fate”), nuclear blackmail, Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, Soviet pressures 
in Iran, Turkey and Greece, the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, and the 
counter-response of the Warsaw Pact.  Id. at 416-17. 
 91. See generally DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR:  THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE 
UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 27 (1978) (describing “red-baiting” as the ultimate 
political weapon in the late 1940s and 1950s). 
 92. See STONE, supra note 61, at 312 (characterizing the post-war era as dominated 
by political opportunism, “bare-knuckled exploitation of anticommunism,” with 
“Americans turned against one another in what would prove to be one of the most 
repressive periods in American history”).  The targets in the Hollywood ranks 
included Dorothy Parker, Lillian Hellman, James Thurber, and Arthur Miller.  Id. at 
313. 
 93. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951) (employing “clear 
and present danger” to deny a free speech claim to the defendant’s public outburst 
against President Truman despite the fact that the primary purpose of the speech 
was to promote a meeting); Am. Comm’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950) 
(upholding requirement that union officers sign “non-Communist” affidavit for 
union recognition); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by 
an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (upholding the defendant’s dismissal 
from a federal job on charges of disloyalty and Communist-affiliation). 
 94. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 95. See STONE, supra note 61, at 395 (noting that six free speech cases were heard 
during World War I while sixty were heard during the McCarthy era). 
 96. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 495. 
 97. See Wiecek, supra note 90, at 433-34 (admitting that “most of the Justices of 
the Vinson Court acknowledged anticommunism as a legitimate expression of 
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Court produced one hundred pages of opinions and a plurality 
applying the Holmes-Brandeis terms to a scenario that did not seem 
to pose a “clear and present danger” to cause harm.98 
Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party-U.S.A., 
was convicted of conspiracy because the Party endorsed a policy to 
overthrow the government.99  The Supreme Court adopted Judge 
Learned Hand’s analysis in the lower court opinion, reiterating his 
rule that “courts must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted 
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”100  Although this formulation stressed 
context by assessing the “evil” threat, it also left the door open on 
imminence by requiring a subjective judicial determination of the 
“probability” that the alleged “evil” threat would occur.101  Using this 
standard, the Court affirmed the conviction of the defendants 
because it believed the Party was prepared and awaiting a call from 
leadership abroad to launch an effort to overthrow the government.102  
Clearly, the context of world events played a role in the Court’s 
depiction of the Party’s capability and threat.103 
                                                          
democratic politics” and seemed prepared to act on this belief). 
 98. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494 (upholding convictions for conspiring to teach and 
advocating the overthrow of the government).  It is important to note that the 
defendants were not charged with attempting to overthrow the government or with 
conspiring to overthrow the government.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 511. 
 100. Id. at 510.  The Court also refers to Judge Hand’s analysis in Masses Pub. Co. v. 
Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), which protected anti-war speech in magazine 
articles because the words did not directly incite resistance to a congressional statute 
prohibiting the obstruction of the military draft.  Although he found that the 
magazine articles did not incite action, Judge Hand acknowledged that words which 
have no purpose but to “counsel the violation of law” do not garner free speech 
protection.  Id.  Determining whether particular words are intended to incite or 
educate, however, must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  Dennis, 341 U.S. at 572.  It 
is noteworthy that even though the Dennis Court adopted Judge Hand’s rule from 
the lower court opinion, Judge Hand later said he believed the Dennis defendants 
were unfairly punished.  See GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 604; infra note 101. 
 101. See STONE, supra note 61, at 400-01 (concluding that the correct test for First 
Amendment cases was the “clear and present danger” standard).  One of the 
conclusions stemming from this probability assessment is that “as the gravity of the 
feared harm increases . . . the degree of likelihood and imminence necessary to 
justify a restriction of speech decreases accordingly.”  Id. at 400-01; see also GUNTHER, 
supra note 42, at 604-05 (iterating Judge Hand’s belief that Dennis would be more 
properly dealt with under his Masses reasoning). 
 102. Dennis, 341 U.S at 505-11 (distinguishing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925), where the Court found that speech that advocates “the necessity or propriety 
of overthrowing organized government by force” was harmful and unlawful by its 
very utterance, no matter the circumstances). 
 103. See Wiecek, supra note 90, at 414-18 (suggesting that fears of a rising 
Communist threat were fed in part by the commencement of the Korean War and 
the House Un-American Activities Committee (“HUAC”) hearings). 
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Six years later, however, Yates v. United States104 “ended the Cold War 
in the Supreme Court,”105 holding that the Constitution could not 
punish the mere “advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an 
abstract principle,” even if the intent of the speaker was to promote 
violence.106  Instead, Justice Harlan opined that advocacy of unlawful 
conduct must include a call for specific action “now or in the 
future.”107  Circumstances again played a role in the Yates decision, as 
much had changed since the Court decided Dennis in 1951—Stalin 
and McCarthy had died, the Korean War was over, and four new 
justices sat on the Supreme Court.108  Although still falling short of 
adopting the “imminence” vision of Holmes-Brandeis, the Court 
ended the Communist witch-hunt.109 
The Dennis and Yates decisions illustrate the Court’s approach to 
free speech in a time of another variable struggle110 that, like the War 
on Terror, seemed to advance with no foreseeable end.111  However, 
                                                          
 104. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 105. See STONE, supra note 61, at 413 (pointing to Stalin’s death, the Senate’s 
condemnation of Joseph McCarthy, a general relaxation in the public attitude 
towards communists, and major changes in the Supreme Court makeup as historical 
changes that influenced Yates and the other three cases argued to have “reversed the 
course of constitutional history”); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating “I do not believe that it can 
be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly 
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner 
or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish”). 
 106. See Yates 354 U.S. at 312, 318-19, 321-24 (stating that the mere “doctrinal 
justification of forcible overthrow” is “too remote from concrete action to be 
regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which was condemned 
in Dennis”). 
 107. Id. at 324-25. 
 108. See STONE, supra note 61, at 413 (remarking that Chief Justice Earl Warren 
replaced Fred Vinson, and Justices Brennan, Whittaker, and Harlan replaced Justices 
Reed, Minton, and Jackson). 
 109. Id. at 415 (providing that “[o]n remand, the government dropped the 
charges against the remaining defendants in Yates [and] dismissed its pending 
charges against Communist leaders in Boston, Cleveland, Connecticut, Detroit, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Puerto Rico, and St. Louis”); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR., A 
WORTHY TRADITION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 212-26 (1988) (observing that 
the judicial attack on Communism ended with the elimination of Yates’ Smith Act). 
 110. See Scheppelle, supra note 30, at 1015 (arguing that “[t]he Cold War was 
different:  it promised an indefinite future of crises . . . and ushered in an era of 
‘permanent emergency’ in which the constitutional sacrifices that were to be made 
were not clearly temporary or reversible”); see also Wiecek, supra note 90, at 417 
(stating that “[s]eeing the period of the Cold War as actually a slow-paced, 
intermittent military engagement, a nightmare from which we could not disengage 
and that threatened our annihilation at any moment, helps us understand the fears 
and reactions of another time”). 
 111. When observing the War on Terror exclusively from the ongoing war in Iraq, 
the War on Terror is generally seen as a low-intensity, undercover endeavor.  See 
generally Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11:  Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 
YALE J. INT’L L. 325 (attributing similar as well as different characteristics of the War 
on Terror when comparing it to a traditional war).  Cf. France Fukuyama, Invasion of 
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hindsight reveals the flaws of Dennis and the significance of Yates.  In 
both cases, to the extent that criminals sowed a conspiracy, those 
actors could have been punished.112  But the Dennis defendants 
merely advocated their party’s doctrine.113  The Court based the “clear 
and present danger” test of Masses and Dennis almost entirely on 
context—communism’s threat of harm—and little else.114  Such a 
contextual analysis runs contrary to the “marketplace of ideas” 
because, by advocating their party’s doctrine, the Dennis defendants 
competed with other political viewpoints. 
In reality, the communist movement’s wares were not selling so 
well in the American marketplace.115  As admitted by John Gates, a 
defendant in Dennis and the editor-in-chief of the Daily Worker, 
communism failed to attract the support of most Americans.116  Thus, 
Yates exposed Dennis’ over-reliance on circumstances of national 
paranoia and triggered the move to a new standard.117  The new 
standard would analyze context only so far as circumstances limited 
                                                          
the Isolationists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A14, available at http://nytimes.com/200 
5/08/31/opinion/31fukuyama.html (asserting that Iraq was only “tangentially 
related to the threat from Al Qaeda”).  But cf. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Good Things 
Take Time, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 2005, at 84, available at http://www.usn 
ews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/050411/11edit.htm (arguing that people must be 
patient for tangible stabilizing effects from the war in Iraq to take place). 
 112. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:  THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 63-64 (1966) (conceiving that the Dennis defendants were unfairly prosecuted 
for their speech because the government was forced to indict on advocacy provisions 
due to the fact that it had insufficient evidence to indict under criminal sedition 
laws). 
 113. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (conceding that the 
defendants did not attempt to overthrow the government).  Despite this, the Court 
pointed out that there was a group ready to make such an attempt in order to justify 
the convictions.  Id. 
 114. See id. at 510-11 (stating that “[t]he formation by petitioners of such a highly 
organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the 
leaders . . . felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable 
nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-
go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least 
ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this 
score”); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 536-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (considering 
the degree of danger posed to American security by the speaker’s nationwide 
movement); see also Wiecek, supra note 90, at 434 (insisting that the “Supreme Court 
overcame the problem of facts not supporting the results it was determined to reach 
by accepting a generic ‘proof’ of Communism’s seditious nature”). 
 115. See Belknap, supra note 27, at 210 (observing that sixty-eight percent of 
Americans favored outlawing the Communist Party-U.S.A. in 1949). 
 116. See STONE, supra note 61, at 397 (noting the government’s fear of the 
Communist Party-U.S.A. was unfounded, and observing that whether the party would 
use force to convert the United States to socialism was irrelevant due to the failure of 
the party to convince a majority of Americans of the merits of socialism). 
 117. See Wiecek, supra note 90, at 434 (concluding that the flaws of the pre-Yates 
Court were due to its use of a “formalist approach to classical legal thought” that 
“ignore[d] the realities of what was happening to individuals who posed no credible 
threat to the nation’s safety”). 
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or facilitated the presence of incitement-type speech in the 
“marketplace of ideas.” 
D.  Brandenburg:  The Modern Incitement Exception 
In 1969, the Court overruled Whitney118 with its landmark decision 
of Brandenburg v. Ohio.119  In Brandenburg, the Court held that the 
Constitution does not permit the government to circumscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of “law violation” unless “such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”120  Thus, advocacy 
would only be punished if the defendant:  (1) expressly advocates law 
violation; (2) calls for immediate law violation; and (3) immediate 
lawless action is likely to occur.121  The Brandenburg exception arose 
because speech that is immediately linked to lawless action has no 
opportunity to face competition in the “marketplace of ideas,” and 
thus, because of its likelihood to cause harm, is not protected by the 
Constitution.122  Brandenburg represented the unencumbered 
adoption of a temporal analysis to determine whether speech posed a 
risk of imminent harm.123 
Although Brandenburg set a new standard for punishing incitement-
type speech, the Court’s definition of “imminence” remained 
ambiguous.124  Few cases have offered clarification in the last three 
                                                          
 118. See 274 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1927) (upholding a statute punishing those who 
participate in “criminal syndicalism,” which is defined in the statute as 
“advocating . . . the commission of crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform”). 
 119. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 120. See id. at 446 n.1, 447 (defending the First Amendment right of a Ku Klux 
Klan speaker to exhort his audience to “[s]end the Jews back to Israel” and to 
“[b]ury the niggers”). 
 121. STONE, supra note 61, at 523. 
 122. See supra Part I.B (explaining the development of the “marketplace of ideas” 
concept in the Supreme Court and its importance in analyzing whether certain 
speech is protected).  But see Tona Trollinger, Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause:  
From a Refuse of Dualism to the Reason of Holism, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 137, 146 
(1994) (criticizing the marketplace metaphor as it applies to hate speech because it 
only invites confrontation and conflict rather than permitting the harmony and 
balance that is meant to be encouraged by the “marketplace of ideas”).  Trollinger 
points out several analytical shortcomings of the marketplace theory, such as “market 
failure in the marketplace of ideas[,] glorification of competition . . . and inversion 
of the causal relationship between individual and societal health.”  Id. at 142. 
 123. See Firester & Jones, supra note 88, at 11 (observing that most scholars narrow 
the imminence requirement from Brandenburg to temporal imminence alone, thus 
requiring that the unlawful action must immediately follow the utterance). 
 124. Id. at 11-12 (describing two tests for imminence proposed by scholars in 
reaction to the failure of the Court to clearly define the term); see also Marc Rohr, 
The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (decrying Brandenburg as “laced with ambiguity 
despite its veneer of clarity”). 
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decades, and none of them have addressed the War on Terror.125  In 
Hess v. Indiana,126 the Court attempted to clarify “imminence” by 
holding that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future 
time” did not trigger the Brandenburg exception.127  In Hess, the Court 
found want of advocacy because the defendant did not direct his 
statements to any specific person or group.128  Further, the Court 
noted that “there was no evidence . . . that his words were intended to 
produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder,” even if the 
defendant’s speech had a tendency to lead to violence.129 
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,130 the Court came closest to 
assigning a strict temporal definition of “imminence,” reasoning that 
advocacy of violence “weeks or months” down the road did not satisfy 
the Brandenburg exception.131  Hess and Claiborne Hardware illustrated 
that speech advocating lawless action must be likely to incite such 
action within a close timeframe and the speech must convey more 
than a vague or ambiguous message.132 
Although the Court struggled for several decades in emphasizing 
its analysis of the context of speech, the temporal limits of the 
                                                          
 125. But cf. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
Rahman’s free speech claims because the seditious conspiracy statute fell outside the 
realm of the constitutionally protected speech dealt with in Brandenburg).  Sheikh 
Abdel Rahman and nine other defendants were convicted of seditious conspiracy 
and other crimes associated with plans to bomb sites in New York City and assassinate 
the President of Egypt and an Israeli citizen.  The Second Circuit upheld their 
convictions.  Id. at 103-04.  Sheikh Rahman, from his headquarters in Jersey City, 
helped facilitate the Egyptian Islamist movement by instructing the murder of non-
believers and serving as an inspiration for the assassination of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat in 1981.  9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 56-57. 
 126. 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 127. Id. at 108. 
 128. See id. at 108-09 (concluding that, since the defendant’s statement was 
ambiguous and not directed toward any person or group, the defendant was not 
actually advocating any action, and thus the speech is protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 129. Id. at 109.  But see David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement:  Freedom of Speech, 
Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-19 
(1994) (criticizing the majority’s decision in Hess as a distortion of the actual facts of 
the case, which, if properly analyzed, would have satisfied the Brandenburg 
exception).  Furthermore, Crump asserts that “[t]he majority’s application of the 
Brandenburg test to the case is rhetoric, not analysis.”  Id. at 15.  He concludes “the 
Hess majority failed to recognize that there can be such a phenomenon as 
camouflaged incitement.”  Id. at 18. 
 130. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 131. Id. at 928.  The speaker called for a boycott of white storeowners and 
threatened those who did not join the boycott by saying, “[i]f we catch any of you 
going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”  Id. at 902. 
 132. See also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1968) (per curiam) 
(invalidating the conviction of a defendant for threatening to shoot the president 
because the defendant’s threat was too indefinite and not meant to literally be a 
threat to kill the president). 
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“marketplace of ideas” largely won out.133  Still, Brandenburg did not 
discard context, but rather incorporated a circumstantial inquiry into 
a wider temporal analysis.134  For example, while Dennis employed a 
balancing test that looked at the magnitude of the threatened 
harm,135 Brandenburg did not evaluate the magnitude of the speaker’s 
threats.136  However, examining context still plays a role in the 
temporal analysis, particularly in determining whether speech is likely 
to cause or incite imminent lawless action.137  Analyzing al-Timimi 
under Brandenburg will illustrate how circumstances determine the 
applicability of the “marketplace” in the War on Terror. 
II. ANALYSIS:  BRANDENBURG APPLIED TO AL-TIMIMI 
A. The Imminence Challenge Presented by al-Timimi’s Conviction 
The evidence provided by the indictment and the earlier 
conviction of al-Timimi’s followers in United States v. Khan138 suggests 
that al-Timimi easily met the first prong of the Brandenburg test by 
expressly advocating violation of the law.139  Unlike the defendant in 
Hess whose statement was not directed at a particular person,140 al-
                                                          
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89 (concluding that, even though 
Holmes and Brandeis were not alive to see the adoption of their “marketplace” 
reasoning by the Court, their reasoning provided the basis for the current temporal 
analysis to the imminence requirement). 
 134. See Rohr, supra note 124, at 19 (maintaining that the context of the speech 
helps determine how wide a latitude is given to temporal limits).  This means that if 
it cannot be shown that the speaker intended to incite illegal action by the speech, 
the speech will remain protected even if it does in fact incite illegal action.  For 
instance, the Brandenburg test has been used to prevent civil actions related to 
situations where an audience member of a concert or movie is compelled to commit 
a dangerous or illegal act by the performance.  Id. at 20. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103 (asserting that the Court weighed 
the magnitude of the threatened harm against the probability of the harm occurring 
to determine if it fell within the “clear and present danger” test). 
 136. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 827 
(2001) (opining “what is decisive about the Brandenburg formulation is that it allows 
speech to be prohibited not because of its harmfulness, but because the speaker seeks 
there and then to bring about a particularized, prohibited, and prohibitable [sic] course of 
conduct”). 
 137. See Firester & Jones, supra note 88, at 10 (acknowledging that “[f]oreseeability 
will be measured by the facts and circumstances of each case”).  But see Crump, supra 
note 129, at 59-60 (arguing that “imminent” refers only to the predictability of the 
unlawful action occurring, and not to any limits in time). 
 138. 309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (2004). 
 139. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 4-5 (charging al-Timimi on six counts, 
including “unlawfully and knowingly aid[ing], abet[ting], counsel[ing], and 
induc[ing]” his followers to “combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and 
with others known and unknown to the grand jury, to unlawfully and knowingly 
commit the following offenses against” the United States).  Four specific violations of 
U.S. law follow.  Id. at 5. 
 140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court 
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Timimi directed his statements to a specific group of listeners.141  In 
these statements, al-Timimi explicitly promoted violation of the law 
by advocating training at L.E.T., joining the Taliban, and fighting 
American forces.142 
However, under a strict temporal interpretation of Brandenburg’s 
“imminence” test, it is harder to show that al-Timimi met the second 
and third prongs of the Brandenburg test—that he intended to incite 
imminent lawless action and that imminent lawless action was likely 
to occur.143  The definition of “imminence” determines the 
applicability of the second and third prongs of Brandenburg.144  
According to the Supreme Court, the temporal gap in time and space 
between the speech and the likelihood of action must not be too 
attenuated to warrant criminalization of speech.145  Here, al-Timimi 
instructed his followers on his view of the Islamic legality of fighting 
American forces, as well as on details to achieve this objective.146  
However, obtaining training in Pakistan and facing American troops 
could still have occurred weeks or months down the road.147  Further, 
al-Timimi directed lawless action halfway across the globe, telling his 
followers to join the fight against American troops in Afghanistan.148  
If “imminence” is constrained by strict temporal limits in space and 
                                                          
determined the speech was protected for a number of reasons, including its 
vagueness and the fact that it was not directed at a particular listener). 
 141. See Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 809-10 (noting that the September 16, 2001 
meeting where al-Timimi made the statements at question in this case included eight 
other specific individuals:  Yong Kwon, Randall Royer, Masoud Khan, Hammad 
Abdur-Raheem, Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem, Muhammed Aatique, Nabil 
Gharbieh, and Khwaja Hasan). 
 142. See id. at 796 (listing the thirty-two counts charged against the defendants). 
 143. See STONE, supra note 61, at 523 (dividing the holding in Brandenburg into 
three separate elements that must be met to satisfy the Brandenburg exception 
analysis). 
 144. See Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., opinion denying 
the petition for writ of cert.) (framing Brandenburg around the question of 
imminence and questioning whether Brandenburg applies to “oral advice, training 
exercises, and perhaps the preparation of written materials”). 
 145. See supra Part I.B (describing how the “marketplace of ideas” approach served 
as the basis for adopting the temporal requirement that the speech and the action 
not be separated by a significant amount of time). 
 146. See Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (explaining how al-Timimi cited religious 
rulings called “fatwas” to support the need for, and legality of, his followers fighting 
American forces). 
 147. See Defendant’s Reply to the Government’s Response to Defendant’s Post-
Trial Motions at 18, United States v. Ali Al-Timimi, No. 04-385-A (E.D. Va. June 28, 
2005), available at http://www.altimimi.org/images/stories/Legal/reply.pdf 
(comparing the facts from the Rahman case to al-Timimi’s case and arguing that al-
Timimi’s advocacy was not for an imminent action since he was “advocating the use 
of force in a conflict that had not yet begun, in a place that was thousands of miles 
away, against an enemy that may or may not ever arrive”). 
 148. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 809-10. 
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time and the absence of a consideration of context, it is difficult to 
prove that al-Timimi intended imminent lawless action. 
B.  Al-Timimi Satisfies the Brandenburg Exception When Analyzed          
in the Context of the War on Terror 
Unlike the line of cases from Schenck to Brandenburg that addressed 
public speech,149 al-Timimi deals with private, secretive speech 
advocating acts dependent on a global network.150  These 
characteristics distinguish some speech scenarios in the War on 
Terror from the public, localized characteristics of previous free 
speech cases.151  Whereas the defendants in Abrams dispersed leaflets 
in a city street to persuade the “marketplace” to rise to their cause in 
a proximate, domestic setting,152 Islamist terrorists achieve their goals 
through subversion and violations of the law that transcend American 
borders.153  After all, al-Timimi did not disseminate his plan in public 
or call for an attack on a nearby target.  Given this scenario, the 
Brandenburg “imminence” test must be understood contextually, and 
not proscribed by strict temporal limits.154  Just as the Court first 
fashioned the imminence exception for speech that did not have 
sufficient time to face competition in the “marketplace of ideas,” 
                                                          
 149. See supra Part I.A-D (outlining the development of this line of cases). 
 150. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 4-5 (offering details on the charges against al-
Timimi and detailing the meeting and the laws that he was advocating for his 
followers to break).  See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
“conspiracy” as “[a]n agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, 
coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement’s objective, and . . . action or 
conduct that furthers the agreement; a combination for an unlawful purpose”).  Al-
Timimi’s conviction touches on conspiracy.  While private, secretive, and unlawful 
speech constitutes “conspiracy” in common law, this Comment draws out the specific 
elements that render al-Timimi’s words incitement to imminent lawless action.  
“Conspiracy” is not used because the term risks confusion with just one element of 
his charge, whereas “private, secretive speech” encompasses all the elements at issue 
in this Comment. 
 151. See supra note 21 (explaining how the term “War on Terror” is used in this 
Comment). 
 152. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1920) (concluding that the 
distribution of leaflets by Russian émigrés occurred for the purpose of inciting 
“disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country”).  While 
the goal of distributing the leaflets was to aid the cause of the Russian Revolution, 
the intent was to incite lawless action domestically.  Id. at 621. 
 153. See infra note 193 and accompanying text (explaining how the global war 
against terrorism is more complex because of its worldwide nature). 
 154. See Firester & Jones, supra note 88, at 7 n.31 (observing that part of the 
contextual consideration is the gravity of the threatened harm, even though gravity is 
not an “official” requirement).  But see S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Taming Terrorists 
But Not “Natural Born Killers”, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 81, 85 (2000) (contending that the 
imminence requirement from Brandenburg means that it is not the harm itself that is 
important in considering whether Brandenburg controls the speech, but rather 
“Brandenburg, properly understood . . . governs abstract exhortations to lawless action 
which might incite a sufficiently susceptible person to action”). 
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secretive speech detailing lawless action dependent on a global 
network and ideology155 should not find constitutional cover.156 
1. Al-Timimi intended to incite imminent lawless action because he 
advocated secretive, global, and detailed action 
The second prong of Brandenburg questions the speaker’s 
intentions.157  Specifically, did the speaker intend his words to incite 
immediate action?  In Noto v. United States,158 the Court held that “the 
mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral 
necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as 
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”159  
Here, al-Timimi offered more than abstract guidance on his 
interpretation of jihad160 in Islamic law.  Al-Timimi offered specific 
directions to his followers to achieve the jihadist objectives.161 
                                                          
 155. See infra notes 170-171 (describing the tenets of Wahhabism). 
 156. Cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Brandenburg and the United States’ War on Incitement 
Abroad:  Defending a Double Standard, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1009, 1031-32 (2002) 
(reasoning that the context of the totalitarian Arab world renders the “marketplace 
of ideas” ineffectual, and thus recommending that a revised understanding of 
Brandenburg is warranted to address those circumstances).  See generally U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., 44th plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.44 (Nov. 10, 2001) (President 
George W. Bush’s remarks to the United Nations General Assembly) (“[E]very 
nation must have avenues for the peaceful expression of opinion and dissent.  When 
these avenues are closed, the temptation to speak through violence grows.”). 
 157. See STONE, supra note 61, at 523 (stating that the second condition that must 
be satisfied to permit the punishment of subversive advocacy under Brandenburg is 
that “the advocacy must call for immediate law violation”) (emphasis omitted). 
 158. 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
 159. See id. at 297-99 (finding that the defendant’s Communist Party activities did 
not include the present advocacy of a violent overthrow of the government, but 
rather his activities merely showed a purpose to possibly advocate such a position in 
the future). 
 160. See Lance S. Lehnhof, Note, Freedom of Religious Association:  The Right of 
Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, 2002 
BYU L. REV. 561, 575 (finding that most scholars agree that “[t]he most common 
definition of jihad is a struggle, usually a struggle for justice, righteousness, or a 
better way of life”); see also RUDOLPH PETERS, JIHAD IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN ISLAM 
122-23 (1996) (contrasting the modernist interpretation of jihad, which focuses on 
the defensive aspects of the concept, with the so-called fundamentalist approach 
which mirrors the classical doctrines that focused on the expansionist aspect of 
jihad).  However, the modernist approach is probably a lot older than commonly 
thought due to the historical stagnation of Islamic expansionism, whereby the 
concept of jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle, propounding 
jihad as a defensive war against enemy attacks on Islamic territory.  Id. at 187 n.52.  
For some in the Western media, however, jihad is commonly referred to as a purely 
violent undertaking.  See, e.g., C.J. Chivers, A Call for Islamic Revolt Spreads in Central 
Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 20 (referring to “armed jihad” as the alternative to 
nonviolence which is publicly espoused by the Hizbut Tahrir, a political party that 
has been banned in the United Kingdom but does not actively seek a violent 
overthrow of the current capitalist and democratic order even though it preaches 
that such an order should be replaced).  But see, e.g., Bernard Lewis, The Revolt of 
Islam, NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2001, at 50, 53 (observing in the context of the early 
history of Islam, that “[t]he application of jihad wasn’t always rigorous or violent”).  
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A Department of Justice news release alleged “[a]l-Timimi believed 
that an American invasion of Afghanistan was imminent because the 
Taliban refused the demands of the United States to turn over Usama 
Bin Laden.”162  Al-Timimi directed his followers to obtain training in 
anticipation of the arrival of American forces to achieve a time-
sensitive goal, not “at some indefinite future time.”163  For example, 
after his meeting with five followers, al-Timimi met again with two of 
them the very next day and specified how to reach L.E.T.164  Further, 
al-Timimi’s insistence on the mission’s furtiveness offers support for 
his unlawful intentions.  The window blinds were drawn, the phones 
were disconnected, and al-Timimi ordered the burning of the 
fatwas.165 
Although al-Timimi advocated action to be taken abroad, the 
characteristics of the War on Terror—covert acts on a global scale—
support his conviction.166  Al-Timimi did not intend for the public to 
learn of his advice.  Rather, al-Timimi intended that his followers act 
as soon as possible before the “marketplace” could deter his unlawful 
solicitation. 
2. The Wahhabi ideology of al-Timimi’s followers promotes global jihad that, 
when coupled with a detailed sanction from the Imam, is “likely to 
produce” imminent lawless action 
The third prong of the Brandenburg analysis measures the likely 
effect of the preacher’s words on his followers’ behavior.167  
                                                          
The Al-Timimi Indictment described “jihad” as “a religious obligation of Muslims to 
struggle or strive for the defense of and advancement of Islam.”  Indictment, supra 
note 1, at 1. 
 161. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 5-6 (containing a list of the many topics al-
Timimi discussed with his followers at the September 16, 2001 meeting). 
 162. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEWS RELEASE 1 (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.us 
doj.gov/usao/vae/ArchivePress/SeptemberPDFArchive/04/TimimiPR092304.pdf. 
 163. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (finding the defendant’s speech 
was protected since, at best, his speech only advocated illegal activity in the future 
and was directed at no particular individual or group of individuals). 
 164. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 6 (alleging that al-Timimi and his followers 
discussed how to obtain military training from the L.E.T.); see also supra notes 8-9 
(defining the L.E.T. and describing its background). 
 165. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (2004). 
 166. Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, From Hit Man to Encyclopedia of Jihad:  How to Distinguish 
Freedom of Speech from Terrorist Training, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 479, 484 (2002) 
(questioning “to what extent do we take into account social and historical context 
. . . to determine if a person has gone beyond mere ‘membership’ or ‘abstract 
advocacy’”). 
 167. See Firester & Jones, supra note 88, at 10 (summing up this portion of the 
Brandenburg test by observing that “if the speaker targets an individual or a group 
prone to violent behavior and vulnerable to outside influences that might exacerbate 
such violent proclivity, it may be highly foreseeable that certain speech will likely 
incite unlawful conduct”). 
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According to Khan, al-Timimi’s followers subscribed to the teachings 
of global jihad and were prepared to act as soon as the time was 
ripe.168  The justification for their global jihad derived from the 
strictures of Wahhabism,169 a religious movement that originated from 
the 18th-century teachings of Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab.170  In 
Wahhabism, al-Timimi’s followers learned of an ideology that 
promotes global jihad as a path to spread the sphere of believers.171  
Like Communism, which divides the globe into the worker’s world 
and the capitalist world,172 Wahhabism divides the world into two 
                                                          
 168. See 309 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (finding that the defendants used paintball to train 
for military activity that may be needed in the future to fight what they believed was 
an impending jihad). 
 169. But cf. Ralph Peters, Turn East from Mecca:  Islam’s Future Will Be Decided on Its 
Frontiers, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at B1 (averring that American intelligence 
analysts have historically refused to accept religious doctrine as a cause of political 
behavior, wishing instead to myopically explain terrorism as based on economic, 
strategic, or tribal factors); NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD:  AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 232 (2003) (noting that most Muslims do not share these 
reactionary views, and that “the option of holy war now seems spent, peripheral, 
unrealistic, and indeed distasteful in light of the violence of September 11”). 
 170. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 
YEARS 333 (1995) (portraying Wahhabism’s tenets as centered on “a return to the 
pure, authentic Islam of the Prophet, and the rejection of the accretions that had 
corrupted and distorted it—superstitions, false beliefs, evil practices, and the regimes 
that upheld and encouraged them”); see also Dov S. Zakheim, Blending Democracy:  The 
Generational Project in the Middle East, NAT’L INTEREST, Oct. 1, 2005, at 43 (accrediting 
Wahhabism with a “mass” counter-reformation following “against the perceived 
dilution of Islamic fundamentals”).  But see Letter from Sahr Muhammad Hatem, Our 
Culture of Demagogy Has Engendered bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Their Ilk, AL-SHARQ AL-
AWSAT, Dec. 21, 2001, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP33102 
(disagreeing that Wahhabism seeks a genuine return to early Islam, believing that 
the “solution” is “the Islam taught by the Prophet of this nation—an Islam of 
tolerance—and not the Islam of [Wahhabism]”). 
 171. See LEWIS, supra note 170, at 310 (depicting Wahhabi doctrine as “puritanical 
in precept, militant in practice”); DORE GOLD, HATRED’S KINGDOM:  HOW SAUDI 
ARABIA SUPPORTS THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM 24-25 (2003) (claiming that although 
jihad is “not one of the five pillars required by Islamic faith . . . [Wahhabism] elevated 
jihad to a central obligation of Islam”).  But see Blaine Harden, Saudis Seek to Add U.S. 
Muslims to Their Sect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at A1 (explaining that followers of 
Wahhabism believe they are obligated to defend Islam, with violence if necessary, 
only in places where it is already well established); James Reston, Jr., Seeking Meaning 
from a Grand Imam, WASH. POST, Mar 31, 2002, at B4 (restating the words of 
Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, the grand imam of Egypt’s al-Azhar mosque who 
condemned the attacks of 9/11 and the killing of innocent civilians, that jihad is 
purely defensive and cannot be aggressive). 
 172. President Bush has compared al-Qaeda’s ideology to Nazism and 
Communism: 
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety.  We have seen their kind 
before.  They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth 
century.  By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by 
abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of 
fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.  And they will follow that path all 
the way to where it ends:  in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. 
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010 
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abodes:  the dar al-Islamiyyah (peace) and the dar al-harb (war).173  The 
latter represents the world of all those who have yet to adhere to the 
will of Allah.174  The determination to carry jihad to the dar al-harb 
may involve the sanction of the religious leader, or imam.175  Like 
funding and military training, the imam’s approval is sometimes a 
material element for global jihad.176 
In al-Timimi, his followers met “the unsurpassable poster boy for 
the Wahhabi lobby.”177  Al-Timimi’s words in mid-September 2001 
were not “mere abstract doctrine,”178 because his followers did not 
seek knowledge on the virtues of their beliefs alone.  Instead, in 
keeping with Wahhabi-Islamist doctrine, al-Timimi asserted that the 
global end-of-time battle179 had begun and specified where and how 
                                                          
920-8.html. 
 173. See 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 51 (referring to the Egyptian writer 
Sayyid Qutb, who served as an inspiration to mid-twentieth century Muslim 
Brotherhood, and to Bin Laden and Islamism generally:  “No middle ground exists 
in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan”).  But cf. SAMUEL P. 
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 32 
(1996) (permitting that a “two-world” theme pervades human history, and is not 
relegated only to Islam).  For example, at the end of the Cold War, American 
scholars divided the world into “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil”.  Id. 
 174. See GOLD, supra note 171, at 25 (citing SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM MUHAMMAD BIN 
ABDUL-WHHAB, KITAB AL-TAWHID 97 (Dar-us-Salam Publ’ns 1996) (estimate 1750)) 
(referring to an old Wahhabi writing advancing a hadith, or oral tradition, that the 
punishment for the non-adherent is “that he be struck with the sword,” wherever he 
may be).  But see Neil MacFarquhar, A Few Saudis Defy a Rigid Islam to Debate Their Own 
Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting on a Saudi professor’s 
challenge to prove the nexus between hatred and violent action:  “Well, of course I 
hate you because you are Christian, but that doesn’t mean I want to kill you”). 
 175. See Reston, supra note 171, at B4 (invoking the explanation of Mohammed 
Sayed Tantawi, the grand imam of Egypt’s al-Azhar mosque, that a central political-
religious authority is needed to declare jihad); cf. GOLD, supra note 171, at 26 
(writing that the Muslim embrace of jihad allows Wahhabism to grant its warriors 
immediate entry into Paradise). 
 176. See, e.g., James Bennet, The Mideast Turmoil:  Protests; Palestinians Swear 
Vengeance for Killing of Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at A1 (stating that, according 
to Israeli officials, Sheik Yassin, the former spiritual leader of Hamas who was killed 
in an Israeli missile attack, approved attacks and motivated suicide bombers); Noor 
Huda Ismail, Schooled For Jihad; They Turned To Terrorism; I Wanted to Know Why, WASH. 
POST, June 26, 2005, at B1 (reporting that the emir of Jemaah Islamiyyah, Abu-bakar 
Baasyir, allegedly gave his approval to terrorists before they bombed Bali, killing 202 
people).  But see Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, Suicide Bombs Potent Tools of Terrorists, 
WASH. POST, July 17, 2005, at A1 (accounting that religious recruitment does not 
sufficiently explain the decision to embark on terrorism). 
 177. Stephen Schwartz, “Wahhabism—the Syphilis of Islam,” FRONT PAGE MAG., 
May 2, 2005  http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=17907 
(explaining al-Timimi’s and his follower’s motives). 
 178. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (finding that the mere 
teaching of a Communist theory, including when or why followers should resort to 
force and violence, did not support a conviction for illegal Communist Party 
advocacy). 
 179. See supra text accompanying note 173 (discussing the struggle in Wahhabism 
between the worlds of war and peace).  But cf. Natana J. DeLong-Bas, WAHHABI 
ISLAM: FROM REVIVAL AND REFORM TO GLOBAL JIHAD 8-13 (Oxford Univ. 2004) 
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his followers should carry out their jihad.180  The meeting took place 
in secret and only those who were prepared to wage immediate jihad 
were invited.181  To those in the room, al-Timimi was their imam182—
“like a rock star,” whose words were dynamite to their ears.183  Under 
these conditions, al-Timimi’s advice was likely to inspire immediate 
action.184 
Although Brandenburg does not inquire into whether a violation of 
the law actually took place,185 evidence of his followers’ behavior after 
the September meetings supports al-Timimi’s conviction.186  Al-
Timimi’s followers did not break the law within moments of their 
preacher’s speech.  However, al-Timimi did not direct them to walk 
out the door and attack the Pentagon.187  Instead, al-Timimi directed 
them to leave the United States and commit their unlawful deeds 
abroad—acts that necessarily take longer than a call to proximate 
violence.188  Still, to this end, his followers acted immediately.  Within 
four days of the meeting, four individuals obtained visas to Pakistan, 
                                                          
(suggesting that the “end of time” battle is a metaphysical struggle derived from the 
Qur’an, which “teaches that at the end of time, human beings will be judged not on 
the sole basis of what they believe, but on how they lived their lives.”). 
 180. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 181. See id. (recounting that only those al-Timimi followers who trained in 
paintball exercises and knew how to fire a weapon participated in the meeting). 
 182. See United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 802-12 (E.D.Va. 2004) 
(reciting that al-Timimi founded the Dar al-Arqam Center, his followers’ mosque in 
Falls Church, Virginia). 
 183. See Debra Erdley, Scholar ‘Rock Star’ to Young, PITT. TRIB. REV., Apr. 5, 2005, 
http://pittsburghlive.com/x/tribunereview/trib/regional/s_320656.html (quoting 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Kromberg, who told the jury that al-Timimi was “like 
a rock star” to his followers).   
 184. Al-Timimi is not the first case where the government prosecuted a Wahhabi 
cleric.  The first World Trade Center bombers of 1993 awaited a necessary sanction 
from Sheikh ‘Abd ar-Rahman.  See Andrew C. McCarthy, Prosecuting the New York 
Sheikh, MIDDLE E. Q., Mar. 1997, http://www.meforum.org/article/336 (“Rahman 
believes [his followers] will defeat the Americans through superior will.  He urges a 
battle of attrition . . . . [H]e counsels patience; [O]peratives should lie in wait for 
opportune moments . . . .”); see also Keehn, supra note 22, at 1253 (applying 
Brandenburg to Raman’s case and explaining why that case would fail the Brandenburg 
exception because Rahman’s sermons were aimed at the “indeterminable future”). 
 185. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (analyzing whether action 
is “likely to produce” imminent lawless action) (emphasis added). 
 186. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (reasoning 
that if a speech, which includes strong language, is followed by acts of violence, there 
is a substantial question whether the speaker is liable for the consequences of the 
unlawful conduct).  The Court believed that evidence of lawless action actually 
occurring would increase the likelihood of finding unlawful incitement.  Id. 
 187. Brief of Defendant, Defendant’s Reply to the Government’s Response to 
Defendant’s Post-Trial Motions at 18, United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 04-385-A (E.D. 
June 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.altimimi.org/images/stories/Legal/reply.pdf. 
 188. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 5-6 (alleging that al-Timimi told his followers 
to obtain military training at L.E.T. and engage in jihad against American troops in 
Afghanistan). 
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drove six hours to New York’s J.F.K. airport, and flew around the 
world to Karachi.189  Within another two weeks, these four broke 
federal law and trained at L.E.T.190  It is difficult to argue that al-
Timimi’s speech was not likely to cause imminent lawless action when 
it in fact did. 
In sum, the context of al-Timimi’s ideology and his standing 
amongst his students must contribute to a broader understanding of 
temporal “imminence.”  The Wahhabi doctrine of al-Timimi and his 
followers laid the foundation for extraterritorial action.191  Yet, unlike 
the scenario envisioned by the Brandenburg “imminence” test,192 the 
violation of the law at issue was not limited to American soil or al-
Timimi’s immediate environs.  Due to the global nature of the War 
on Terror, the violation of the law occurred farther away and took 
longer to achieve than ordinary incitement-type cases.193  However, 
whereas in other contexts such temporal gaps in space and time 
normally demonstrate the efficacy of the “marketplace of ideas,”194 
the War on Terror’s additional characteristic—subversion—illustrates 
the ineffectiveness of the ordinary “marketplace” safeguard.  Did al-
Timimi’s speech face competition in the “marketplace of ideas”?  
This Comment argues that his private words did not, and this 
question is addressed in detail next. 
When al-Timimi gave detailed instructions to his followers to carry 
out global jihad, his words (1) expressly advocated violation of the 
                                                          
 189. See id. at 6-7.  The speedy action undertaken by four of al-Timimi’s followers 
is further underscored by the fact that in the days following 9/11, all flights were 
suspended, and when flights finally did resume, airlines did not immediately resume 
a normal schedule.  See Dean E. Murphy, After the Attacks; A Wounded City Struggles to 
Discover How to Carry On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A12 (stating that “airplanes 
were grounded” during the week after 9/11). 
 190. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 6-7 (alleging that the four traveled to L.E.T. 
and fired weapons there).  Similar to the heightened state of alert in America, the 
security scene in Pakistan was abnormally strict in the weeks following 9/11, lending 
further support to the speed and detail with which al-Timimi’s followers acted.  See 
9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 368 (noting that Pakistan arrested more than 500 
al Qaeda and Taliban operatives after 9/11); see also Steven R. Weisman, On the Front 
Lines in the Global War Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A34 (discussing 
President Pervez Musharaff’s decision to deploy Pakistani forces and help the United 
States combat terrorism). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 170-173 (explaining that the Wahhabi 
doctrine promotes global jihad to spread the will of Allah). 
 192. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(stating “this is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with action,” and 
the two are “inseparable”). 
 193. Cf. Crocco, supra note 23, at 457 (noting Brandenburg’s “modern application 
has been to situations more akin to the real-time characteristics of a soapbox”). 
 194. See David F. McGowen & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University 
Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 858 (commenting that Brandenburg 
forbids punishment of speech where the listener has “sufficient space” to consider 
and reject the message and any unlawful conduct for which it advocates). 
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law, (2) were intended to incite imminent lawless action, and, due to 
al-Timimi’s leadership and his follower’s global motives, (3) were 
“likely to produce” imminent lawless action.195 
III. DOES BRANDENBURG APPLY TO AL-TIMIMI?  RECOMMENDATIONS:  
BROADEN THE DEFENITION OF “IMMINENCE” OR DEVELOP A DIFFERENT 
STANDARD TO ADDRESS PRIVATE ADVOCACY 
The history of free speech jurisprudence bespeaks a struggle 
between the idealistic “marketplace of ideas” and the wartime 
abridgement of free speech liberties.196  In this struggle, wartime 
represents the merging of the nation’s vulnerabilities with unique 
possibilities for detractors to exploit those vulnerabilities.197  However, 
this Comment does not argue that the War on Terror necessitates the 
restraint of free speech and a return to a pre-Brandenburg model.  As 
Justice O’Connor wrote in June 2004:  “It is during our most 
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment 
to due process is most severely tested . . . .”198 
                                                          
 195. See supra text accompanying note 121 (explaining that speech may only be 
punished under Brandenburg if (1) the speaker expressly advocates law violation, 
(2) the speaker calls for immediate law violation, and (3) immediate lawless action is 
likely to occur). 
 196. See supra text Parts I.A, I.B, and I.C (discussing the application of the “clear 
and present danger” test during World War I, Justices Holmes’ and Brandeis’ 
“marketplace of ideas” theory and insistence on requiring an imminent threat of 
harm as part of the “clear and present danger” test, and the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of an approach similar to that of Holmes and Brandeis during the Cold 
War). 
 197. See Hannigan, supra note 36, at 1375 (recounting Justice Brennan’s 
understanding of why a crisis leads to the abridgement of civil liberties). 
First, the crisis creates a ‘national fervor,’ which in turn leads to an 
exaggeration of the ‘security risks posed by allowing individuals to exercise 
their civil liberties.’  This exaggeration results in a public willingness to 
accept restraints on civil rights in the short term while the national crisis 
lasts.  Inexperienced decision-makers are generally ‘reluctant to question the 
factual bases underlying asserted security threats.’  This reluctance leads to 
an inability on the part of decision-makers to distinguish the true security 
risks from the exaggerated ones, allowing for repetition of the cycle. 
Id. (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil 
Liberties in Times of Security Crises, Speech at the Law School of The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, at 1-2 (Dec. 22, 1987), 
http://www.capaa.wa.gov/pdf/brennan.pdf).  See also Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating “war opens dangers that do not 
exist in other times”). 
 198. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (O’Connor, J.) (commenting 
that, for purposes of national defense, we should not take away any of those liberties 
that “make the defense of our nation worthwhile”); see also Oren Gross, Chaos and 
Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 
1030-31 (2003) (asserting that the true challenge of terrorism is that it will cause 
democracies “to embrace and employ authoritarian measures”). 
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Instead, this Comment recommends that the Court employ the 
same “marketplace” reasoning underlying Brandenburg by broadening 
the understanding of “imminence” to include the criminalization of 
detailed incitement to immediate and global acts of terrorism.199  
Brandenburg symbolized the Court’s adoption of the “marketplace” 
doctrine that “built a ‘fortress’ around core political speech,”200 and 
only permitted the punishing of speech that was so imminently 
linked to harm that it did not face competition in the 
“marketplace.”201  The War on Terror also presents a context where 
subversive speech does not reach the “marketplace.”202  In other 
words, if the “marketplace” is a forum of open debate where all 
opinions are heard, a harmful, private opinion that does not reach 
the public forum should not be allowed the ordinary safeguards that 
only punish speech closely linked to unlawful acts in space and 
time.203 
                                                          
 199. Cf. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging that judges should “adapt their doctrines” to new 
causes of action that “threat[en] . . . the central meaning of the First Amendment”).  
In Ollman, Judge Bork pointed out that the framers did not fathom the threat of libel 
actions to free speech.  Id. at 996.  Similarly, the framers of the First Amendment and 
the authors of the “marketplace of ideas” extrapolation may not have imagined the 
global terrorism that employs mass fear to threaten free societies.  Yet, by adapting 
the doctrine to Al-Timimi, the Court can distinguish free speech from criminal 
speech masquerading as free speech so as to preserve basic attributes of a democratic 
system, like free enterprise and freedom of movement.  Cf. Fouad Ajami, Heart of 
Darkness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at A16 (inferring that Sunni terrorism’s goal in 
Iraq is to prevent the ascent of a fair and democratic order). 
 200. STONE, supra note 61, at 524. 
 201. See Arielle D. Kane, Sticks and Stones:  How Words Can Hurt, 43 B.C. L. REV. 159, 
160 (2001) (asserting that prior restraint of speech is permissible under Brandenburg 
only where harmful or illegal conduct will follow so immediately from the speech 
that there is no time for debate to stop such conduct); see also Rabban, supra note 63, 
at 1352 (recognizing that Brandenburg does not distinguish between “public 
ideological solicitation” and “private non-ideological solicitation,” and suggesting 
that private speech may warrant a less protective standard because it varies 
significantly from principled political resistance). 
 202. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment:  In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1982) (questioning the 
effectiveness of applying the “marketplace” protection to all speech categories 
because “[t]here may be inadequate time or opportunity for response, the ‘false’ 
speech may be more persuasively phrased, or the audience may simply not be 
sufficiently sophisticated or sufficiently interested to ascertain the difference 
[between the true speech and the false speech]”); Thomas F. Ditzler, Malevolent 
Minds:  The Teleology of Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 204 (Fathali M. 
Moghaddam & Anthony J. Marsella eds., 2004) (implying that even if Islamists 
participated in the marketplace, they are unreceptive to public debate because “in a 
world of absolute truth . . . there is no room for dissent and no room for theological 
doubt”). 
 203. See supra Part I.B (observing that some speech never reaches or otherwise 
competes in the “marketplace,” and that if such speech is likely to cause immediate 
harm, it does not receive the protections of the First Amendment); cf. 9/11 
COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 375 (suggesting that those committed to violent Islam 
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Applying the earlier NAACP reasoning204 to a different twist on the 
al-Timimi facts, suppose al-Timimi delivered a public sermon 
imparting his general beliefs on the meaning of jihad.205  The 
preacher would be immune from prosecution because in theory, the 
public “marketplace” would have the opportunity to rebut his 
reasoning and win over his listeners.206  The answer becomes more 
difficult if al-Timimi gave the same detailed advice as he did in 
September 2001,207 but in public, subject to the “marketplace.”  
Employing ordinary temporal limits on “imminence,” this speech may 
not satisfy the Brandenburg exception.  In that case, the level of detail 
offered and the reception entertained by the preacher’s listeners may 
determine whether the speech counseled criminal behavior.208 
If the courts cannot successfully apply the public speech 
Brandenburg exception to al-Timimi’s private speech,209 then the Court 
should develop a non-Brandenburg standard to cover the secret 
advocacy of a detailed call to lawless action that has no opportunity 
for rebuttal in the “marketplace of ideas.”210  Such a recommendation 
is consistent with the Holmes-Brandeis jurisprudence, because those 
                                                          
are “impervious to persuasion,” even if the inciting speech competed in the 
libertarian marketplace). 
 204. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (holding that 
speech advocating lawless action weeks or months down the road cannot be 
punished, thus ascribing temporal limits to speech that lingers in the “marketplace”). 
 205. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 112 (2002) 
(applying marketplace principles to various scenarios where Islamic preachers 
advocate terrorism). 
 206. But see id. at 213 (grappling with the limits of applying the “marketplace” to 
radical Islamic leaders and potential terrorists:  “[T]hese potential murderers live in 
closed societies where the flow of information to them is carefully controlled by 
those determined to use these vulnerable people as human weapons”). 
 207. See Indictment, supra note 1, at 6, 8 (alleging that al-Timimi advised his 
followers to obtain military training at L.E.T., to reach L.E.T. undetected, and to 
carry out jihad against American troops in Afghanistan). 
 208. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 205, at 112 (speculating that, if a case where an 
Islamic leader advocated for terrorist attacks came before a court, it would be 
decided on its particular facts, including “how close in time the terrorism 
followed . . . , how specific the religious command was, and how free the potential 
terrorists felt to reject it”). 
 209. See Charles H. Jones, Proscribing Hate:  Distinctions Between Criminal Harm and 
Protecting Expression, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 935, 949 (1992) (contending that 
Brandenburg does not apply to private consensual acts because it was “purely a 
political advocacy case”); see also Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 
(1977) (refusing to apply Brandenburg to the prosecution of advertisers for illegal 
contraceptives because the unlawful act could not be characterized as an attempt to 
promote imminent lawless action). 
 210. Cf. Bruce Fein, Tackling a Root Cause of Terrorism, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, 
at A16 (calling on the United States to criminalize the advocacy of jihad or similar 
terrorist activity that has the specific intent of bringing about terrorism). 
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Jurists believed that speech that does not compete in the 
“marketplace” should not find constitutional cover.211 
The theory underlying this alternative recommendation is that 
Brandenburg’s reach is limited to “soapbox” speech—public 
advocacy.212  Simply put, Brandenburg has never been applied to a 
private speech case.213  A non-Brandenburg approach to private speech 
allows for wider latitude outside strict temporal considerations in 
determining whether, and/or at what point, private speech may be 
prosecuted.214  In al-Timimi’s case, this alternative recommendation 
posits that his speech did not compete in the “marketplace” before 
unlawful action occurred. 
                                                          
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89 (explaining the view of Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis that some speech does not reach or otherwise compete in the 
“marketplace,” and that such speech should not be afforded the protections of the 
First Amendment). 
 212. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Mag., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020-23 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(differentiating Brandenburg’s concern over public “arousal” from cases dealing with 
written material and implying that the state interest in regulating public speech is 
much less than the state interest in regulating private speech); Daniel Halberstam, 
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 829 (commenting that the First Amendment rights of 
speakers arise most often in the context of public debate, and citing, as an example, 
“[t]he soapbox orator and loan pamphleteer . . . disseminating their views about 
matters of public concern to whomever chooses to stop and listen”). 
 213. See Kent Greenwalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has thus far only 
applied the Brandenburg test in public advocacy cases).  Greenwalt steps back to 
suggest: 
[The] extent of the . . . test’s applicability remains unclear . . . . Does the test 
also set a general constitutional limit on punishment for urging criminal 
acts?  If a sister writes her brother urging that he steal money from their 
parents, is that protected speech if the theft is not to happen for a few weeks 
or the brother is unlikely to do what the sister asks?  American cases have 
generally assumed that ordinary criminal solicitation does not present a 
serious [F]irst [A]mendment problem, and I have argued that Brandenburg 
should not cover such situations; but no case contains a developed or 
satisfactory explanation of the distinction between public advocacy and 
private solicitaiton. 
Id. 
 214. See generally Redish, supra note 202, at 1180-81 (criticizing the application of a 
Brandenburg-style (i.e., “stringent”) imminence requirement in unlawful advocacy 
cases because opportunity for reasoned response will not always defuse such 
advocacy, and advocating for a more flexible imminence requirement).  But cf. 
Trollinger, supra note 122, at 198 (questioning the underpinnings of “marketplace” 
theory because it “cannot conceive that private speech which inflicts acute social and 
individual harm is an ‘abridgement’ of speech” when it does not otherwise fall within 
the condemnation of the First Amendment).  There is a difference between words 
not gaining protection from the “marketplace” and the basic application of 
“marketplace” theory altogether.  In the former, speech is criminalized pursuant to 
“marketplace” reasoning, i.e., the speech did not face competition.  Redish, supra 
note 202, at 1162-63.  In the latter, the very notion that speech is protected because it 
faces competition in the “marketplace” is questioned.  Id. at 1162. 
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Although this recommendation is fact-sensitive and dependent on 
how speech is understood to reach the “marketplace,” it would be a 
significant step in advancing the War on Terror.215  Thwarting 
terrorists is immediately important.  Thwarting their source—a 
hateful ideology and the ability to obtain support to carry out 
attacks—is a long-term imperative if America is to retain a 
government of the people, for the people. 
CONCLUSION 
At his sentencing hearing on July 13, al-Timimi delivered an 
impassioned speech, reading from the Preamble of the 
Constitution.216  His homily was ironic, considering al-Timimi’s 
disdain for his home country, the “greatest enemy.”217  Al-Timimi 
wishes to destroy America by wrapping his vitriol in the cloak of the 
Constitution.  Al-Timimi is allowed to hate the United States.  But he 
is not allowed to solicit treason.  Like him, preachers who advocate in 
detail and in privacy the violation of law should not find a free haven 
in America.  With preachers like al-Timimi subject to the full power 
of the law, the War on Terror will take a definitive step forward. 
 
                                                          
 215. See Rohan Gunaratna, The Post-Madrid Face of al-Qaeda, WASH. Q., Summer 
2004, at 95, www.twq.com (follow “Archives” hyperlink; then follow “Terrorism” 
hyperlink under the heading “Topic”; then follow “The Post-Madrid Face of al-Qaeda” 
hyperlink under the heading “Threats, Sponsors, Trends”) (recommending a 
proactive pursuit of Islamic extremists who “disseminate propaganda, recruit 
members . . . [and] facilitate travel”). 
 216. Ali al-Timimi, Statement in Court (July 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.altimimi.org (follow the hyperlink under the heading “Dr. Al-Timimi’s 
Statement in Court after the judge denied his motions”); Eric Lichtblau, Scholar is 
Given Life Sentence in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A21, available at 
http:// www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/national/14cleric.html?. 
 217. Following the Columbia shuttle disaster in 2003, al-Timimi published the 
following: 
There is no doubt that Muslims were overjoyed because of the adversity that 
befell their greatest enemy.  Upon hearing the news, my heart felt good 
omens that I liked to spread to my brothers . . . The Columbia crash made 
me feel, and God is the only One to know, that this is a strong signal that 
Western supremacy (especially that of America) . . . is coming to a quick end, 
God Willing, as occurred to the shuttle. 
Indictment, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
